

The Hong Kong Daily Press.

No. 1910 1891

18 SEPTEMBER

午前版

HONGKONG, THURSDAY, 18th SEPTEMBER, 1891.

午前版

PRICE \$28 PER MONTH.

Arrivals.

Sept. 21, OSAMA, Brit. br., 327, Leslie, Kolo
9th September, General John BURD &
Co.
Sept. 21, UNITED SERVICE, Brit. br., 650
Tough, Singapore 11th September, and
10th General, J. BURD &
Co.
Sept. 21, EOLE, French br., 363, Boncheron
Singapore 11th September, Timor
Oader.
Sept. 22, YESSO, Brit. br., 583, Ashton, Foo
chow 17th September, Amoy 18th, and
Swatow 21st, General D. LAPRAIK &
Co.

Departures.

Sept. 21, YUN-TEH-FEI, str., for Shanghai.
AT THE HARBOURMASTER'S OFFICE,
September 21st,
London, str., for Saigon.
Shropshire, str., for Saigon.

Passengers.

For United Service, str., from Singapore,
30 Chinese.
For East from Singapore.
10 Chinese, str., from East Coast.
Moses, Wade, Dunn, Ellis, 1 European
deck and 35 Chinese.
Per Hooley, str., from Saigon, &
For Saigon, 4, for Singapore.
Mr. E. Weil, for Paris.
Mr. G. Palatino, for Marsella.
Mr. Gonzales.

Reports.

The British steamship United Service reports
strong variable winds with equally weather and
strong S.W. current.

The French bark Eole reports carried S.W.
breeze up the China sea and the Ladrones, was
sighted, then light N.E. wind.

The British bark Odele reports fine weather and
light N.E. winds all the way, except when
off Formosa, there experienced heavy rain.

The British steamship Yesso reports moderate
N.E. winds and fine weather to Amoy, saw the
Articles of Association of the Company, the
Second Call of Twenty-five Dollars per share is
payable on the 30th instant at the Hongkong
Branch of the Chartered Mercantile Bank
of London, and China, and the
Second Call of Twenty-five Dollars per share
is payable on the 30th instant at the
Hongkong Office, and all maturities coincide
with the Society.

Intimations.

HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION, £1,000,000 of Dollars
SUBSCRIBED & CAPITAL £1,000,000 of Dollars.

Court of Directors.

Chairman—H. BURD, Esq.

Deputy Chairman—H. BURD, Esq.

The Circular and Directory for 1870
NOW READY.

THE Edition for 1870 is now ready for delivery.

As already announced, the Directory is published in Two Parts, Comprising \$3, or with the Lists of Residents and Particulars, only, \$1.

Copies may be obtained at the Daily Press Office, and of the following Agents—

MEETIN & CO., SHANGHAI.

WILSON, NICHOLS & CO., AMY.

REED & CO., FOOCHOW.

LAW, CRAWFORD & CO., SHANGHAI.

KELLY & CO., "do."

WAIGHTS, GROD & CO., JAPAN.

MR. L. P. FISHER, MERCHANT, FOOCHOW.

SAN FRANCISCO.

The latest of the Daily Press, from and after publication on Wednesday morning at 10 A.M.,

sellers will be at 10 A.M.

The Daily Press

HONGKONG, SEPTEMBER 22ND, 1870.

A FEATURE of much importance in connection with the present aspect of affairs in China, is suggested by the Shanghai *News Letter*, in the course of an able review of recent events. It is pointed out that, whereas formerly the ill-feeling towards foreigners was confined to a few places, and at them chiefly to the Mandarin classes, there is, at the present time, a widespread enmity throughout the country. This can be the result only of long and careful fanning of a flame, and forms internal evidence of the manner in which the anti-foreign faction has been gradually attaining an ascendancy. It is lamentable under such circumstances to find, as recently noticed, that the leading Journal in England persistently maintains there is no danger to foreigners in China, and advocates the continuance of the policy which has been the chief cause of the present state of affairs. It is not very difficult to understand how these false views gain currency, though it is none the less lamentable to find them spreading, as their results cannot be otherwise than of the most disastrous nature. These views readily emanate from that section of the Chinese officials, who, though they secretly entertain a dislike to foreigners, are yet aware that it would be dangerous to oppose them, and consequently are not altogether insincere in their professions of a willingness to preserve friendly relations. Among this class are Prince Kung and other, leading members of the Foreign Board at Pekin. These officials would be glad, if possible, to preserve an entirely negative attitude. They would not willingly do anything that would provoke active hostility against foreigners, as they are aware that such a course would be attended with the most dangerous results. But their friendliness does not go beyond this negative point. If they are unwilling to offend foreigners, they are equally unwilling to offend the large class of powerful officials who, unaware of the extent of power possessed by European nations, would be glad to see a foreigner's nose scolded up to the point at which hostilities must occur. Their declarations of friendliness are, therefore, of little consequence, as their friendship does not go so far as to be any assistance against the hostility of the opposite faction. Even if they were desirous to do so, it is now tolerably clear they could not support foreigners against the opposition made in other directions. These mildly friendly officials, however, have the care of the foreign representatives, and their assurances of friendliness are mistaken by them for the existence of a peaceful feeling throughout the country, whereas everything shows that, even if they were willing actively to assert the rights of foreigners, they have not the power to do so. This negative kind of friendship, relied upon by foreigners with Chinese prophecies, and especially by officials of the Wade and Alcock school, is far more dangerous than avowed hostility. If enmity be known to exist precautions are taken, and it is only necessary in China for foreigners to be upon their guard for them to be safe, as a comparatively small amount of material force will, as is well known, go very far, so long as it is known that, in the event of outrages being committed, the action on the part of foreign nations will be prompt and decisive. But our Representatives, and, in their ranks the home papers, which, in return for information, support the Government in matters of this description, rely upon the friendship of a section of the Chinese officials who, even if they were willing from motives of prudence, to act fairly and honestly for the protection of Europeans, are unable to do so in the face of the opposition of a powerful anti-foreign faction, and who, if opportunity offered, would only be too glad to side with it. Under ordinary circumstances they take no steps to put down its action. On the contrary, they have been found on many occasions going farther than adopting a merely negative action, having, as in the case of Chia Kwo-ji, openly given their support to those who there has been no question were openly hostile to foreigners, and were using their utmost endeavours to bring about their expulsion from the country.

Thus, at the present time, the Tung-ya-men declares its friendship, at the same moment that it departs Tung-ya-men, boldly the leader of the anti-foreign party, to punish the malefactor, at Tientsin, and, after permitting him to evade the responsibility of taking any action worthy of the name in the matter, re-appoints him to the most powerful Viceroyalty in the Empire, that of two Kiang, and sends him back to Nanking, where, surrounded by his old partisans, he will be able to mature further plots. How is it possible to rely upon friendship such as this? It amounts to mere profusion, and when called upon for active demonstration, is found to be nothing but an empty name, word in fact, for it may be a square inducing us to rely upon officials who will be found utterly powerless in the hour of need. They are friends to us no more than they are to our bitterest antagonists, the crowded anti-foreign party, and are friends to both enmity to the extent that they fear them. Our safety, therefore, so far as the Imperial authorities are concerned, depends at any given moment upon the question whether they fear us more than they fear the Mandarins and functionaries in the country, who

are opposed to us. If such is the fact, they will use their influence to put down opposition, and to that extent we shall be the gainers by their assistance.

But there is also a further bearing of the subject which is too often overlooked. Even if the Imperial Authorities through a consciousness of the troubles they will incur by getting into collision with European nations, are really disposed to stand by us, they are frequently unable to face the opposition made by large foreign combinations secretly incited by a portion of the Mandarins themselves. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that those who are disposed to cause trouble should be made themselves sensible of the disaster which such conduct in certain to bring about, and this can only be done by their being made aware that any outrages against foreigners will be followed by immediate and severe punishment. If there is the certainty of such a punishment being inflicted on Pekin, they will always have the idea that there is a fair chance of escape, as has in fact been the case in the case with regard to the recent tragedy at Tientsin. The presence of a certain amount of force, and the declaration that in case of necessity, it will be resorted to, is, in reality, not only the one means upon which foreigners can rely for protection and safety, but it is in reality the most merciful arrangement for averting calamity from the Chinese people themselves. Our showing hostility in adopting means of protection is but encouraging outrage. Encouraging outrage is but courting war, and the outbreak of war between China and a foreign nation cannot but be attended with widespread disaster to the Chinese, and the punishment of those not directly implicated. It is far better to bring force into play at an earlier stage, or rather to show a determination to do so, if necessary, which will be the surest means of preventing the necessity altogether. It is satisfactory to find that, although the *Times* has taken a false view of this question, the *Standard* Review, which was before inclined to the same side of the question, frankly admits the necessity for adopting a more vigorous policy; and there may yet be hope that the full details as to the present state of affairs become known, the public will gain a more accurate appreciation than they have hitherto had of the true nature of our position, and of the error that is made in relying implicitly upon assurances of friendliness on the part of the Imperial government.

We understand that a little departmental difficulty, which is not without importance with regard to the local administration of the Colony, has sprung up with reference to the issue of permits to hold religious ceremonies, and otherwise to burn incense paper in the town. It appears that the practice hitherto has been for permits to be issued from the office of the Registrar General, and for counter-signature to the Head of the Police. This plan, it seems, is now found to be adopted with sundry inconveniences; the chief of which is that the Superintendent of Police is not consulted before the pass is issued, so that he might have an opportunity of stating any objections that might exist in any individual case. This and other similar reasons have caused the question to arise whether the permits should not properly be issued by the Police authorities, and an instruction, if necessary, will be given to the Registrar General. Their declarations of friendliness are, therefore, of little consequence, as their friendship does not go so far as to be any assistance against the hostility of the opposite faction. Even if they were desirous to do so, it is now tolerably clear they could not support foreigners against the opposition made in other directions. These mildly friendly officials, however, have the care of the foreign representatives, and their assurances of friendliness are mistaken by them for the existence of a peaceful feeling throughout the country, whereas everything shows that, even if they were willing actively to assert the rights of foreigners, they have not the power to do so. This negative kind of friendship, relied upon by foreigners with Chinese prophecies, and especially by officials of the Wade and Alcock school, is far more dangerous than avowed hostility. If enmity be known to exist precautions are taken, and it is only necessary in China for foreigners to be upon their guard for them to be safe, as a comparatively small amount of material force will, as is well known, go very far, so long as it is known that, in the event of outrages being committed, the action on the part of foreign nations will be prompt and decisive. But our Representatives, and, in their ranks the home papers, which, in return for information, support the Government in matters of this description, rely upon the friendship of a section of the Chinese officials who, even if they were willing from motives of prudence, to act fairly and honestly for the protection of Europeans, are unable to do so in the face of the opposition of a powerful anti-foreign faction, and who, if opportunity offered, would only be too glad to side with it. Under ordinary circumstances they take no steps to put down its action. On the contrary, they have been found on many occasions going farther than adopting a merely negative action, having, as in the case of Chia Kwo-ji, openly given their support to those who there has been no question were openly hostile to foreigners, and were using their utmost endeavours to bring about their expulsion from the country.

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But there is also a further bearing of the subject which is too often overlooked. Even if the Imperial Authorities through a consciousness of the troubles they will incur by getting into collision with European nations, are really disposed to stand by us, they are frequently unable to face the opposition made by large foreign combinations secretly incited by a portion of the Mandarins themselves. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that those who are disposed to cause trouble should be made themselves sensible of the disaster which such conduct in certain to bring about, and this can only be done by their being made aware that any outrages against foreigners will be followed by immediate and severe punishment. If there is the certainty of such a punishment being inflicted on Pekin, they will always have the idea that there is a fair chance of escape, as has in fact been the case in the case with regard to the recent tragedy at Tientsin. The presence of a certain amount of force, and the declaration that in case of necessity, it will be resorted to, is, in reality, not only the one means upon which foreigners can rely for protection and safety, but it is in reality the most merciful arrangement for averting calamity from the Chinese people themselves. Our showing hostility in adopting means of protection is but encouraging outrage. Encouraging outrage is but courting war, and the outbreak of war between China and a foreign nation cannot but be attended with widespread disaster to the Chinese, and the punishment of those not directly implicated. It is far better to bring force into play at an earlier stage, or rather to show a determination to do so, if necessary, which will be the surest means of preventing the necessity altogether. It is satisfactory to find that, although the *Times* has taken a false view of this question, the *Standard* Review, which was before inclined to the same side of the question, frankly admits the necessity for adopting a more vigorous policy; and there may yet be hope that the full details as to the present state of affairs become known, the public will gain a more accurate appreciation than they have hitherto had of the true nature of our position, and of the error that is made in relying implicitly upon assurances of friendliness on the part of the Imperial government.

We understand that a little departmental difficulty, which is not without importance with regard to the local administration of the Colony, has sprung up with reference to the issue of permits to hold religious ceremonies, and otherwise to burn incense paper in the town. It appears that the practice hitherto has been for permits to be issued from the office of the Registrar General, and for counter-signature to the Head of the Police. This plan, it seems, is now found to be adopted with sundry inconveniences; the chief of which is that the Superintendent of Police is not consulted before the pass is issued, so that he might have an opportunity of stating any objections that might exist in any individual case. This and other similar reasons have caused the question to arise whether the permits should not properly be issued by the Police authorities, and an instruction, if necessary, will be given to the Registrar General. Their declarations of friendliness are, therefore, of little consequence, as their friendship does not go so far as to be any assistance against the hostility of the opposite faction. Even if they were desirous to do so, it is now tolerably clear they could not support foreigners against the opposition made in other directions. These mildly friendly officials, however, have the care of the foreign representatives, and their assurances of friendliness are mistaken by them for the existence of a peaceful feeling throughout the country, whereas everything shows that, even if they were willing actively to assert the rights of foreigners, they have not the power to do so. This negative kind of friendship, relied upon by foreigners with Chinese prophecies, and especially by officials of the Wade and Alcock school, is far more dangerous than avowed hostility. If enmity be known to exist precautions are taken, and it is only necessary in China for foreigners to be upon their guard for them to be safe, as a comparatively small amount of material force will, as is well known, go very far, so long as it is known that, in the event of outrages being committed, the action on the part of foreign nations will be prompt and decisive. But our Representatives, and, in their ranks the home papers, which, in return for information, support the Government in matters of this description, rely upon the friendship of a section of the Chinese officials who, even if they were willing from motives of prudence, to act fairly and honestly for the protection of Europeans, are unable to do so in the face of the opposition of a powerful anti-foreign faction, and who, if opportunity offered, would only be too glad to side with it. Under ordinary circumstances they take no steps to put down its action. On the contrary, they have been found on many occasions going farther than adopting a merely negative action, having, as in the case of Chia Kwo-ji, openly given their support to those who there has been no question were openly hostile to foreigners, and were using their utmost endeavours to bring about their expulsion from the country.

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Thus, at the present time, the Tung-ya-men declares its friendship, at the same moment that it departs

To Let.

TO LET.—
With commercial premises,
TWO ROOMS, situated in the southern portion of the Club Chambers, Water and Gas laid on.

For Particulars apply to
J. S. HOOK, SON & CO.

1512, Hongkong, 16th August, 1870.

TO LET.

FROM 1st September, two or three spacious ROOMS, suitable for OFFICES 1st floor of building lately occupied by Messrs. T. H. BUNN & CO. Apply to

J. S. HOOK, SON & CO.

1427, Hongkong, 16th August, 1870.

TO LET.

THOSE double ROOMS, known as No. 6

10, Cross Chambers,

DOUGLAS LAPRAIK & CO.

17th Hongkong, 21st June, 1870.

TO LET.

With possession on 1st January next,
THE very desirable Business PREMISES,
situated the corner of D'AGUILAR STREET
and Water Street, at present occupied by

A. B. BROWN & CO. Apply to

DOUGLAS LAPRAIK & CO.

2347, Hongkong, 13th December, 1869.

HOUSES TO LET.

IN various Parts of Hongkong. A list of
HOUSES with size, locality and terms can
be seen at No. 47, Wyndham Street.

THOS. W. BURGESS.

1426, Hongkong, 16th March, 1870.

TO LET.

With possession on 1st April next,
THE HOUSE and OFFICE, No. 9, Queen

Street, at present occupied by Messrs.

KIRKNESS, BOGIE & CO. Apply to

GIBB, LIVINGSTON & CO.

1124, Hongkong, 16th July, 1869.

TO LET.

With possession on 1st April next,
THE FIRST-CLASS Granite GODOWNS, at

Wardour, from 12 to 30,000 piculs capacity.

Apply to

S. E. BURROWS & SONS.

1730, Hongkong, 17th September, 1869.

Vessels on the Berth.

FOR NAGASAKI.—
THE departure of the steamer

"SUNSHINE" is postponed until 20-21st, the 22nd instant, at noon.

For Freight or Passage, apply to

DOUGLAS LAPRAIK & CO.

3d 1702, Hongkong, 26th September, 1870.

STEAM TO SWATOW, AMOY, AND FOOCHOW.

THE P. & O. S. N. C. steamship

"AZOF" will leave for the above places with quick despatch.

W. MAGAULAY, Superintendent.

P. & O. S. N. C. Office, Hongkong, 21st September, 1870.

FOR SHANGAI.

THE British Steamer

"DELAWARE," Capt. Fisher, expected here on 23rd inst., will have quick despatch.

For Freight or Passage, apply to

GILLEY & CO.

1703, Hongkong, 26th September, 1870.

FOR FOOCHOW.

(Calling at AMOY, if sufficient indorsement of her.)

A British Barque

"CORYPHUS," Captain Ray, will have immediate despatch as above.

For Freight or Passage, apply to

BIRLEY & CO.

1707, Hongkong, 17th September, 1870.

FOR MANILA.

THE Spanish Brig

"LUDWIK," will have quick despatch for the above port.

For Freight or Passage, apply to

BERMEDIOS & CO.

1708, Hongkong, 17th September, 1870.

FOR SYDNEY, and should sufficient indorsement of her, NEW ZEALAND.

THE British Barque

"MEMENTO," Captain Thompson, will have early despatch as above.

For Freight or Passage, apply to

RUSSELL & CO.

1709, Hongkong, 14th September, 1870.

FOR BOMBAY.

THE well-known British ship

"CHATHAM," having a stern cabin, offers a most desirable opportunity to a family wishing to proceed to that port.

For Freight or Passage, apply to

CAPTAIN ON BOARD.

1710, Hongkong, 15th September, 1870.

FOR SHANGAI.

THE fine Ocean Steamer

"ERCHILLA," W. Liley, Commander, expected here from the River via Suez Canal on or about the 13th September, will meet with quick despatch as above.

For Freight or Passage, apply to

POUBJAU, HUBNER & CO.

1702, Hongkong, 22d September, 1870.

FOR SAN FRANCISCO.

THE 1st American clipper

"GUIDING STAR," E. M. Freeman, will have early despatch for the above port.

For Freight or Passage, apply to

RUSSELL & CO.

1707, Hongkong, 17th September, 1870.

FOR NEW YORK.

THE 1st American Clipper

"GAMCOOPER," Captain Sherburne, will load at Whampoa for the above port, and will have immediate despatch.

For Freight, apply to

OLYMPIA & CO.

1707, Hongkong, 17th September, 1870.

FOR NEW YORK.

THE 1st American Clipper

"OSCEOLA," Walden, master, will have despatch from Whampoa for the above port.

For Freight, apply to

AUGUSTINE HEARD & CO.

2d 1723, Hongkong, 17th September, 1870.

FOR NEW YORK.

THE 1st American Clipper

"LUFRA," Built January, 1870, 672 Tons Registered, Captain J. Hodge, will have immediate despatch for the above port, and his room for a limited amount of cargo.

The above vessel will be followed by the 1st American Clipper "Gaea."

For Freight, apply to

OLYMPIA & CO.

1707, Hongkong, 20th August, 1870.

FOR MELBOURNE AND SYDNEY.

THE British Ship

"MARGUERITE,"

Mr. Macmillan, the master, port of

Canton, will have immediate despatch for the above port.

For Freight or Passage, apply to

ROZARIO & CO.

1709, Hongkong, 21st September, 1870.

FOR LIVERPOOL.

Mr. Macmillan, the master, port of

Canton, will have immediate despatch for the above port.

For Freight or Passage, apply to

THURSTON & CO.

1709, Hongkong, 21st September, 1870.

FOR NEW YORK.

Mr. Macmillan, the master, port of

Canton, will have immediate despatch for the above port.

For Freight or Passage, apply to

THURSTON & CO.

1709, Hongkong, 21st September, 1870.

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